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Abstract
Calvo contracts, which are the basis of the current generation of New Keynesian models, widely
include indexation to general ination. We argue that the indexing formula should be expected
ination rather than lagged ination. This is likely to optimise the welfare of the representative agent
in a general equilibrium model of the New Keynesian type. The economy behaves under rational
indexation is similar to a New Classical model, with shocks producing an immediate uctuation in
both prices and output followed by a fairly rapid return to steady state. The monetary policy that
targets price level brings a greater economic stability.
Keywords: Calvo contracts, general equilibrium, rational indexation.
JEL Codes: F41, F42, E42
We thank for useful comments, without implicating them, Michael Beenstock, Matthew Canzoneri, Harris Dellas,
Max Gillman, Campbell Leith, Bennett McCallum, John Moore, Charles Nolan, Alan Sutherland, and participants in the
conference of the Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomics at St. Andrews University in September 2005. We also thank
David Meenagh for help on a number of technical and programming issues.
yCorresponding Author: LeVP@Cardi¤.ac.uk
1
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the behaviour of a DSGE model with Calvo contracts in which there is some
form of indexation. Specically, we ask what would be the optimal form of any such indexation.
This question is interesting because within the context of the New Keynesian model, which is widely
used by central banks for the analysis of monetary policy, recent work (eg Christiano et al 2005, Smets
and Wouters, 2003, 2007) has maintained that an indexation mechanism is both theoretically attractive
and empirically helpful. They have assumed that indexation would be to lagged prices or wages. However,
other forms of indexation are possible; in particular a more natural and potentially e¤ective mechanism
would be forward-looking, indexation to the rational expectation of prices or wages. Thus we could think
of agents raising wages and prices in line with what they currently anticipate (on the basis of available
information) future ination to be. As noted by Minford and Peel (2003, 2006) this has the e¤ect of
making the Calvo model behave much more like a New Classical model, with a high degree of exibility
in the general level of prices and wages.
Some New Keynesian authors have dismissed this idea on the grounds that the data rmly reject
such a model. However, in a recent paper Meenagh et al (2008) have found that the Smets and Wouters
(2003) DSGE model of the EU could t the data only under the assumption that 94% of the labour and
product markets were competitive. Also, Le and Minford (2008) nd that the Smets and Wouters (2007)
model of the US only t the data given 90% of the labour markets and 80% of the product markets
are perfectly competitive. Thus, these economies are modelled on New Classical assumptions. Hence it
cannot be right to reject this sort of indexation on purely empirical grounds. On the contrary it might
well be that it could rescue New Keynesian models from empirical failure.
2 The basis for indexation
The theoretical basis for nominal rigidity set out by Calvo (1983) has been widely adopted in recent work
of the so-called New Keynesian type  also known as the New Neo-Keynesian Synthesis  for example
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003). In the Calvo contract nominal rigidity can last
indenitely in the sense that there is a limited chance for wage- or price-setters to change their setting
in any period. Hence once a price or wage is out of linewith its equilibrium there is a chance it will
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continue for ever. This has seemed an attractive set-up for modellers who wanted a basis for nominal
rigidity with substantial potential real e¤ects1 .
More recently, it has been recognised (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005; Smets and Wouters,
2003, 2007 for example) that the uncompromising nominal rigidity in Calvo (1983) ought to be modied
to allow for some indexing process whereby general ination is passed through by wage/price-setters. The
argument has been that the chances of changing price identied in the Calvo model relate to the changing
of a relative price, for example on the grounds that some micro menu cost threshold is stochastically
disturbed by some micro event. If then there is some general ongoing ination this would be passed on
by all including those who would not, on micro grounds, wish to change their relative price. Thus the
menusoutside the restaurants are all updated for general ination; some individual menus are then
raised more or less than that according to micro shocks. In the literature, two specic ways have been
widely pursued for doing this: indexing to coreination (the ination trend, to be somehow determined)
and alternatively to lagged ination2 . We can perhaps think of indexation as one element in the business
of nominal protection, that is protecting price- and wage-setters against movements in the general price
level. Another element is the use of expectations of ination over the lifetime of the contract in the
initial setting of wages and prices; notice that the basic Calvo model has this element but only for those
who are able to change their prices. For wages the same arguments would indicate that wages should
additionally be updated automatically for general rises in real wages, so that a general wage index would
be used for them. In what follows we assume that indexation is of price ination for prices and wage
ination for wages.3
Christiano et al. (2005) have noted how adding lagged indexation allows their model, with some other
1Nevertheless recent work has exposed a variety of puzzles arising from this set-up. On the one hand there are the
empirical di¢ culties of the original theory noted for example by Mankiw (2001), Mankiw and Reis (2002), Ball (1994),
Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Bakhshi et al (2003), Rudd and Whelan (2003) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003). On the other
hand, a number of articles have pointed to the time-inconsistency problems posed for policy. The essence of these problems
lies in that indeniteness of duration for rigidity; once prices or wages have got out of line there is a strong incentive not to
worsen matters by causing yet more prices or wages to get out of line, even if commitments have been made to stabilising
prices or ination along a particular initially-optimal path. A partial list of work that has addressed these issues would
include: Goodfriend and King (2001), Khan, King and Wolman (2002), Svensson and Woodford (2003), McCallum (2003),
Collard and Dellas (2003), and Woodford (2003).
2Further examples are Casares (2002), Ascari (2003); additionally Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof (2003, 2001) and Ce-
spedes, Kumhof and Parrado (2003) have recently suggested further forms of indexing based on rules of thumb based
on learning. All these schemes violate the strict natural rate hypothesis (that no monetary policy should be capable of
permanently changing output and employment) whose absence from the original Calvo set-up was noted by McCallum
(1998)  see also Minford and Peel (2002) for examples of how monetary policy can manipulatereal outcomes.
3By indexation we mean some automatic contract formula moving all prices (or wages) according to some publicly
available information of the general price level. We rule out any other contingent contract clauses, simply because these
are ruled out by the Calvo mechanism. Thus indexationis not to be confused with the optimal price paths, conditional
on available information, for example, of Mankiw and Reis (2003), where the sole constraint is the periodic arrival of new
information; these paths will no doubt contain a planned reaction to expected future ination among other things a¤ecting
the optimal path. But under Calvo contracts such exibility is not allowed.
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modications of purely rational behaviour, to generate the hump-shaped impulse responses they nd in
the data. This empirical success has become a further defence of Calvo contracts with lagged indexation.
However, recent works by Meenagh et al (2008) and Le and Minford (2008) have further found that
impulse responses in the data can also be generated by models with very little nominal rigidity, such as
the one with indexation to rationally expected ination we also consider below; furthermore, when the
shocks to the VAR are identied by using the model being tested, then many of these responses are not
even hump-shaped.
How should indexation be best carried out however? This issue has not been addressed in the Calvo
model though there has been a long series of papers on it in a variety of other macroeconomic models
going back to Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977) (see also Barros critique, 1977). They, building on earlier
work, suggested labour contracts could act as insurance for workers (e.g. Azariadis, 1975, and Baily,
1974; and see Malcomson, 1999, for a review of the contract literature) and argued that wages would not
be fully indexed because it was not feasible to draw up a fully-contingent contract, expressed throughout
in real terms; hence the indexation parameter would stand in as a contingent response to shocks that
is partial. More recently, Minford, Nowell and Webb (2003) revived this approach within a model of
overlapping contracts; here indexation to lagged ination operated side by side with expected ination
at the start of the contract.
These papers have found, unsurprisingly, that the degree of optimal nominal protection will vary
with the characteristics of the monetary regime. At the one extreme where the regime is volatile and
creates persistent shocks protection is high; at the other extreme where there is no monetary volatility
at all protection is likely to be low and its exact nature also depends on how real shocks behave. One
important aspect explored in Minford, Nowell and Webb (2003) was the e¤ect of switching from a generic
ination targeting rule to a generic price level targeting rule; they found that because price level targeting
increased price level certainty it reduced the need for indexation as a way of stabilising consumption.
The model here is di¤erent but similar considerations apply; so we have also explored the e¤ect of such
a monetary rule switch here.
In assessing optimality these papers have usually considered a cooperative equilibrium strategy. This
is a natural choice since agents could well be deterred from changing prices or wages automatically
in response to some general measure of ination unless they were sure others (especially in their own
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industry) were doing the same. In this paper we also use this cooperative approach. Minford and Peel
(2006, Appendix) showed how, in a partial equilibrium context, where agents were acting individually
taking otherschoices as given, it was optimal for a price-setter to index to lagged expected ination
rather than to lagged ination; the reason was that, given expectations about the future state of the
economy, the lagged expectation, being the optimal forecast from the lagged information available, allows
the agents expected plan for real outcomes to be achieved on average whereas the alternative creates a
bias. It can be argued however that in general equilibrium a cooperatively-adopted rule of indexation
would not necessarily give the same ranking; for example the forecast bias created might generate a
useful o¤set to the distortion created by price/wage reactions to real shocks.
We do not consider in detail how this cooperative approach could be achieved in practice. Various
mechanisms are possible. Trade unions or employers organisations could organise it for example; or
there could be a sharing of information across agents in which coordination was suggested and agreed
by discussion; or it could spread from private maximisation in partial equilibrium as above to general
acceptance.
In what follows we rst sketch out in an overview how in a standard New Keynesian model the
addition of indexing a¤ects outcomes. In the next section we work analytically with a much simplied
version of this model. We then proceed to show a wider set of results via numerical simulations on a
calibrated version of the full model. Finally we consider the robustness of the results to changes in our
assumptions, especially to the monetary rule.
3 The Model With Indexation  an overview
The model used is a nonlinear NNS model (Canzoneri et al., 2004), characterized by optimizing agents,
monopolistic competition, nominal inertia and capital accumulation. It is very closely related to the
models of Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and Collard and Dellas (2003). Staggered price setting
leads to a dispersion in rmsprices that creates an ine¢ cient variation in output levels across rms,
and staggered wage setting leads to dispersion in the distribution of employment across households.
We study various versions of this model. In the simplest we abstract from capital and assume exible
wages  this version is tractable analytically and we examine it in a loglinearised form. Our rst version
assumes lagged indexation. In it price-setters know that prices will rise by the lagged index anyway and
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so their problem is to forecast real marginal costs and also the di¤erence between the general price level
and the index  this latter will turn real marginal costs plus the index into actual nominal marginal
costs, which is what they aim to match. It is this version that we now proceed to analyse.
In this model the price-setters forecasting problem relates to a real variable, real marginal costs, and
a nominal error  the extent that the index fails to equal actual prices. Of course perfect indexation
would simply be actual prices and so this error would disappear. When the index is lagged prices, the
error is simply the current rate of ination. Then the price-setters problem is to forecast real marginal
costs and current and future ination. This is the standard problem solved by agents in Christiano et
al (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). It has a familiar solution, given that both real marginal
costs and ination are persistent variables.
However in our second version where the index is the price level expected last period, this error
is purely random. This means that the price is set solely in respect of expected real marginal costs,
since the expected price error is zero. However now consider the actual price level; it is equal to the
whole history of prices set by price-setters, all uprated by the price level expected last period. If we
take rational expectations of this, it implies a restriction on expected prices being set by price-setters
this period: the indexing process itself will uprate prices by any predictable move that price-setters
would otherwise make, a move that is related to the previous pricing error. Price-setters must therefore
be expected last period to o¤set this lagged error this period. We are more used to these restrictions
in a plain New Classical model, where the expected output gap is forced to generate no inationary
pressure; similarly here expected marginal costs must be such as to generate no inationary pressure
or else innite ination would be produced.
In addition to this expected price-setting we must add the unexpected element in prices set, the
pricing error, which will be related to the shock in productivity (real marginal costs) observed by
price-setters in this period. Thus the previous pricing error will also be related to the lagged shock in
productivity. It follows that prices set are equal to the expected part, related to the lagged shock in
productivity, plus the e¤ect of the current productivity shock.
Such are the restrictions placed by rational expectations when the indexing process itself is rational:
the indexing process is aiming o¤ for all systematic e¤ects in price-setting. .
In e¤ect this is forcing set-prices to be a moving average process of order one in a real variable, the
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productivity shock. The actual price surprise is a function of the set-price surprise. But to nd actual
prices, the sum of the set-price and the indexing component, we have to solve for expected prices, the
indexing component: this comes from the Taylor Rule and the expected behaviour of output (expected
productivity again). Thus it is that we get a New Keynesian model with some resemblance to New
Classical. The set-price (related to real marginal costs and so to the output gap) has moving average
behaviour  much like the output gap in a New Classical model may have. Meanwhile price behaviour
depends on the behaviour of monetary policy.
The account we have given relates specically to the simplied model with no capital and wage
exibility. But the basic patterns are the same in more complex models, which we simulate numerically.
Notice that there is still not complete price/wage exibility because current shocks disturb both prices
and output and create lagged e¤ects. However plainly this New Keynesian model has far more price/wage
exibility than either the New Keynesian model with lagged indexation or that with no indexation at
all.
4 A simplied model with exogenous capital and a competitive
labour market
We rst examine what private sector indexation behaviour would be optimal assuming that monetary
policy followed a standard Taylor Rule. Our model contained three shocks: a money shock to the Taylor
Rule, a productivity shock and a government spending shock. However the last turned out to be of no
importance and thus in practice we considered only the rst two  one nominal and one real.
As the full model is complex and nonlinear, we investigate a much simplied version in which capital
is exogenous and made a non-tradeable endowment resource, while the labour market is assumed to be
competitive. All the equations are loglinearised.
(1) Each rm is a price-setter, which forms the expectation of its price for period t based on micro
information of period t and macro information of period (t  1) : Each rm f minimises its total cost
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subject to its production function:
min TCt(f) =WtLt(f)
s:t Yt(f) = Zt K
Lt(f)
1 
where K is exogenous and logZt = 1 logZt 1 + zt. The labour demand function is derived from the
above production function Lt(f) =

Yt(f)
Zt K
 1
1 
: The rms cost minimising problem implies that the
nominal marginal cost is
MCt =
1
1  WtLt(f)
 1
Zt K
and thus, loglinearised real marginal cost is
logmct = logWt   logPt +  logLt(f)  logZt (1)
In regards to households, each of them maximises the life-time expected welfare subject to his budget
constraint and labour demand, but without the capital accumulation constraint in this simple set up.
However, besides the assumption of fully complete contingent claims that make the households homo-
geneous in their consumption decisions, the competitive labour market means they are homogeneous
in labour supply also. The welfare maximisation implies every household supplies Nt units of labour:
Nt =
Wt
PtCt
and its log-linear form is given by
 logNt = logWt   logPt   logCt (2)
The competitive labour market also means that in equilibrium the supply of and demand for labour
must be equal so that the equation (1) becomes
logmct = logWt   logPt +  logNt   logZt
(2) The production function is given as:
log Yt = logZt + (1  ) logNt (3)
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(3) Ignoring government spending, the market clearing condition gives
log Yt = logCt (4)
(4) We use a simple Taylor Rule, without lags and with the real interest rate assumed to be set in
response to ination and the output gap, with a monetary shock:
rt = t + (log Yt   logZt) + logMt (5)
Adding in the Euler equation logCt = logCt+1   rt and allowing for market clearing gives us an
Aggregate Demand curve:
log Yt =
1
1  B 1 f 
t +  logZt    logMtg
where logZt = 1 logZt 1 + zt; logMt = 2 logMt 1 + t; zt and t are i:i:d.; B
 1 is the forward
operator instructing one to lead the variable but keeping the expectations data-set constant; and  =
1
1+ :
(5) The reset price level loglinearised around its equilibrium is:
logP t =
(1  )Et

logmct + logPt   log ~Pt

1  B 1 (6)
This is rewritten in terms of the determinants of real marginal cost (from equations (1) ; (2) ; (3) and
(4) as:
logP t =
(1  )
1  B 1Et

1 + 
1   (log Yt   logZt) + logPt   log
~Pt

(7)
Notice that though the rm at t knows its own marginal cost and its own price, in order to forecast
the future paths of variables required to set its price it needs to know Yt, Pt and ~Pt which are macro
variables; of these it only knows ~Pt. It does of course know Zt, its own productivity level.
(6) The log-linearised form of the aggregate price equation is given as
logPt   log ~Pt = 

logPt 1   log ~Pt 1

+ (1  ) logP t (8)
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(7) The loglinearised price dispersion, logDPt; is derived using a conventional second order Taylor
expansion around P t i = 1 :
logDPt =
1
2
1i=0p
i (1  ) 1  i (1  )  logP t i2   1j=01i=0pi+j (1  )2 logP t i logP t j
(9)
4.1 Solving the model under rational indexation
We now solve the model in turn under rational (this section) and lagged indexation (next section). so that
we may compare the two welfare expressions. Our notation is as follows: Et 1xt = E(xtjt 1);Etxt =
E(xtjt 1; t);xUEt = xt   Et 1xt , where t 1 is the full information set from period t   1 and t is
the limited information set available (to the agent forming expectations) for period t.
Assume under rational indexation that
log ~Pt = E (logPtjt 1)  Et 1 logPt
Applying this assumption to equation (8) ; we get:
Et 1 logP t =  

1  
 
logPt 1   Et 2 logPt 1

(10)
and
Et 1 logP t+i = E
t 1Et logP t+i = 0; 8i > 1
The reset price is therefore:
logP t = E
t 1 logP t + logP
UE
t = logP
UE
t  

1   logP
UE
t 1 ; (11)
where from equation (8)
logPUEt = (1  ) logP UEt (12)
and from equation (7) and the assumption that rms have knowledge of their own micro information
(productivity, prices and costs) in period t as well as the macro information of period (t  1):
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logP UEt = logP

t   Et 1 logP t
= (1  ) i=0 ()i

1 + 
1  

Et 1 log Yt+i   Et logZt+i

  (1  ) i=0 ()i

1 + 
1  

Et 1 log Yt+i   Et 1 logZt+i

= (1  )

1 + 
1  

1
1  1
( zt) (13)
Hence, given equations (11) ; (12) and (13) the reset price is rewritten as
logP t = logP
UE
t    logP UEt 1 = 0
(1  L)
(1  ) ( zt) ; (14)
where 0 = (1  ) (1  )

1+
1 

1
1 1 :
Thus we have found as noted in the overview that rational expectations has placed restrictions on the
behaviour of the reset price. Because of the relation between expected reset prices and expected future
developments in the economy, we obtain further restrictions on the latter (just as in a New Classical
model expected output is forced to converge on output potential) :
(a) Et 1 logP t+j = (1  ) i=0 ()i

1 + 
1  

Et 1 log Yt+i   Et 1 logZt+i

+j
= 0 8j > 1
, Et 1 log Yt+i = Et 1 logZt+i; 8i > 1
(b) Et 1 logP t = (1  )

1 + 
1  

Et 1 log Yt   Et 1 logZt

=   
1   logP
UE
t 1
Now we look at the output side of the model, where under rational expectations output consists of
the expected output and the surprise change in output. First, using the Aggregate Demand curve we
obtain for surprise output:
log Y UEt =   logPUEt + zt   t (15)
and from the restrictions on expected reset prices above:
Et 1 log Yt = Et 1 logZt  


1  

1
(1  )

1  
1 + 

logPUEt 1 :
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The latter equation is in turn written as follows
Et 1 log Yt = Et 1 logZt + v0zt 1; (16)
where v0 =


1 

1
(1 )

1 
1+

and we have used the expressions above for surprise prices and reset
prices.
Using equations (12) and (13), the unexpected component of output can be written
log Y UEt = 
( + 0)zt   t (17)
The Aggregate Output therefore is just a sum of its expected and unexpected components  equations
(16) and (17)
log Yt = 1 logZt 1 + v
0zt 1 + ( + 0)zt   t (18)
and
log Yt   logZt = v0zt 1 + (0   1)zt   t (19)
4.1.1 Welfare under rational indexation
Under the exible price and wage assumption, the welfare level would be
uFLEXt = logZt (20)
However, in the economy of price rigidity and competitive labour market, the welfare function is
ut = logCt   N+1 logNt (21)
where logCt = log Yt = logZt + (1  ) logNt   logDPt and logNt = 11  (log Yt   logZt) :
We evaluate expected welfare in terms of its deviation from the ex-price optimum:
E
 
ut   uFLEXt

= E
26641     N+11  
8>><>>:
v0zt 1 + (0   1)zt
 t
9>>=>>;
3775  E logDPt (22)
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Notice that the unconditional mean of the rst element in this expected welfare term is 0. So
e¤ectively we only consider the second term, where it is known respectively from equations (9) and (14)
that
E
 
ut   uFLEXt

=  E logDPt
=  1
2
1i=0p
i (1  ) 1  i (1  ) var  logP t i
+1j=0
1
i=0p
i+j (1  )2 Cov  logP t i; logP t j
and
logP t =  00zt + 00zt 1;
where 00 = 
0
1  : The expected welfare is (Appendix 9.1.1):
E
 
ut   uFLEXt

=  p002var(z) (23)
4.2 Solving the model with lagged indexation
The solution for lagged indexation follows more familar lines. We write the index as
log ~Pt = E
t 1 logPt + (k logPt 1   Et 1 logPt) (24)
where if k = 1 then there is full lagged indexation log ~Pt = logPt 1, and if k = 0 then there is a no
indexation and log ~Pt = 0: We will focus here exclusively on the case of full lagged indexation, k = 1:
Using this assumption and equation (8) ; the general price is
logPt = E
t 1 logPt + vt 1 +
(1  ) logP t
1  L ;
where vt 1 = logPt 1   Et 1 logPt =  Et 1t. This equation can also be written as
 
logPt   Et 1 logPt
  vt 1 + vt 2    logPUEt 1 = (1  ) logP t
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and taking the expectation Et 1 throughout and manipulating this equation, we get expected reset price
Et 1 logP t =
 vt 1 + vt 2    logPUEt 1
1   (25)
What we see is that the expected reset price now contains the the last two expected ination rates;
these terms are the bias in indexation away from its rational value.
We use equation (7) and its expectation
Et 1 logP t =
(1  )
1  B 1E
t 1Et

1 + 
1   (log Yt   logZt) + logP
UE
t   vt 1

to obtain unanticipated reset price
logP UEt = (1  )

1 + 
1  

1
1  1
( zt) (26)
4.2.1 Solving for logPt and logP t under lagged indexation
Using the equations for ination together with the Aggregate Demand curve above yields (Appendix 1 section 9:2:1):
t =
1  
1  L
1  
1  B 1Et



1
1  B 1
 t   (1 B 1) logZt    logMt	+ t (27)
where  = 1+1  : The solution for the general ination rate has the Wold decomposition form t =
i=0it i + i=0izt i; use undetermined coe¢ cients to solve for t: Thus the solution for t is by
implication:
t =  Ett+1 =  i=0i+1t i   i=0i+1zt i (28)
We once again nd the solution for outputs deviation from its exprice value which now becomes:
log Yt   logZt =
 
log Y UEt   zt

+ Et 1(log Yt   logZt)
= ((0   1)zt   t)+

1
(1  )
0BB@ 0zt 1   (1+)1  vt 1+

1+vt 2 +

1 E
t 1vt
1CCA (29)
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4.2.2 Welfare under lagged indexation
Expected welfare is
E
 
ut   uFLEXt

= E
26666664
1   N+1
1 
0BBBBBB@
((0   1)zt   t)+
n
1
(1 )
o0BB@ a0zt 1   (1+)1  vt 1+

1+vt 2 +

1 E
t 1vt
1CCA
1CCCCCCA
37777775 E logDPt (30)
But again, we only have to consider the second term in this welfare expression, where
 E logDPt =  1
2
1i=0p
i (1  ) 1  i (1  ) var  logP t i
+1j=0
1
i=0p
i+j (1  )2 Cov  logP t i; logP t j
with
logP t =
0
1   ( zt + zt 1) 

t 1   t 2
1  

(Appendix 9:2:2) (31)
We have the following expressions: t 1 = logPt 1   Et 1 logPt =  Et 1t is correlated with
zt 1; but t 2 = logPt 2  Et 2 logPt 1 is uncorrelated with zt and zt 1. Assume that  t 1 t 21  =
 0zt 1 + qt 1; where  0zt 1 combines all terms in zt 1; and qt 1 is uncorrelated with zt 1 and zt:
Comparing this with the new reset price under rational indexation, this lagged indexations renewed
price function has the extra term  t 1 t 21  : For the task below, we temporarily take the expected
welfare under rational expectation as a benchmark. To compare the expected welfare under lagged
indexation to the benchmark, we need to investigate whether this extra term in renewed price improves
or worsens the expected welfare level in respect to the benchmark.
It can be seen that there are two elements in this term. The rst,  0zt 1; is potentially helpfully
correlated with the lagged term in the rational indexation solution for logP t ; hence it could potentially
reduce E logDPt: The second, qt 1, adds noise to the solution and hence must increase E logDPt:We can
nd a closed form expression for the latter but the former requires numerical calculation. In Appendix
9.2.3 we look at whether this latter term can be signed unambiguously.
What we nd is that for productivity shocks the e¤ect of rational compared with lagged indexation
is ambiguous; extra noise is introduced by the lagged index but some of it is correlated with the lagged
productivity in a potentially helpful way. For monetary shocks rational indexation is unambiguously
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superior because in this case these shocks have no e¤ect on the reset price and therefore on welfare;
under lagged indexation monetary shocks at t  1 and before all enter the current reset price setting.
4.3 Conclusions from the simplied model
What we nd is that it is optimal within this simplied version of the model to index reset prices to
the rational expectation of the price level in the face of monetary shocks; in the face of productivity
shocks it is ambiguous. We thus nd, in line with earlier work, that the type of indexation will depend
importantly on the monetary regime. Thus, to put it rather crudely, provided monetary shocks are large
enough, rational indexation will be optimal.
We also nd that should rational indexation be chosen for this reason, then expected welfare is
invariant to monetary policy; and the economys Phillips Curve defaults to a New Classicalone where
output depends on current and lagged real shocks but otherwise only on monetary surprises as in Lucas
(1972); there is an echo here of Sargent and Wallaces (1975) famous irrelevance result three decades
ago. The intuition behind this result is that rational indexation builds into prices the e¤ect of any
shocks known at time t   1. Whatever has happened at t   1 is, in the case of the productivity shock,
built into the expected real reset price for next period; this xes expected real marginal cost and hence
expected real output. The expected price index is then calculated as the necessary price increase that
will accommodate this and the expected level of interest rates. Unexpected monetary shocks have no
e¤ect on prices because they have been pre-set in this way. Thus only lagged money shocks a¤ect prices
while only unexpected money shocks a¤ect output under rational indexation in this model under the
assumption made up to now that agents have no information on economy-wide variables.4
5 Extending our results  Stochastic simulation results on the
full model under micro private information
So far we have been considering optimal indexation using a simplied linearised model, with only prices
being set (and with no capital). We now use numerical methods to investigate the full model and other
4Notice too that in a corrolary of this point, again echoing Sargent and Wallace (ibid.), price level determinacy cannot
be produced by an interest-rate rule targeting ination unless the lagged price level is given; yet the model cannot generate
such a lagged price level under such a regime unless again the twice-lagged price level was xed and so on ad innitum.
It is necessary when using such a rule to specify the lagged price level exogenously via an initial condition, presumably
indicating that at some previous point a di¤erent rule was being pursued.
16
assumptions about monetary policy; we also consider the possibility of less than full indexation, as well
as a mixture of rational and lagged indexation. To do this we can no longer use analytic methods
because of the rise in complexity; thus we move to numerical methods under calibration. We use Dynare
(Juillard, 2003) which employs a second order approximation of the model. Throughout the simulation,
we use a discount factor  of 0:99. The Cobb-Douglas capital share parameter,  = 0:25, implies that the
output-labour elasticity is 0:75. The wage and price markup rates are w = p = 1:167. The constant
probability determining the degree of price stickiness is  = 0:67; this implies that an average price
contract duration is 3 periods, while the probability of wage resetting is assumed to be 1   ! = 0:25
in every period, implying an average wage contract length of 4 periods. The Frisch elasticity of labour
supply is 0:33: These are the calibration parameters used by Canzoneri et al. (2004) in their benchmark
specication.
We proceed to consider the stochastic simulations for expected welfare in terms of deviations from
the ex-optimum under both lagged and rational indexation when only micro information is assumed to
be known at period t. The aim is to relate these results to those from the analytic model above. Table
1 shows that expected welfare is maximised by rational indexation, just as in the analytic model.
Type of shock k1 kw1 k0 kw0 E(Welfare)
Ination target Money/productivity
0
0
:2
1
0
0
:2
1
1
:8
1
1
1
:8
1
1
 0:0048
 0:01311
 0:01626
 0:02669
Price target Money/productivity
0
0
:2
1
0
0
:2
1
1
:8
1
1
1
:8
1
1
 0:0048
 0:01032
 0:01120
 0:01994
k0 and kw0 are the extent of price and wage indexation respectively (1=100% indexation;
k1 and kw1 are the weight on rational indexation in price and wage equations respectively
(1=100% weight on rational indexation)
Table 1: Expected welfare for di¤erent types of indexation assuming only current information is micro;
interest rule with ination and price level targets (stochastic simulation of monetary and productitivty
shocks, each with standard error of 0.01)
We now nd that monetary policy does, strictly speaking, have an e¤ect on expected welfare under
rational indexation. The reason for this is the introduction of wage-setting. Though prices are only
a¤ected by the productivity shock (because it alone is currently observed), the interest rate rule reacts
to both ination (or prices) and to the output gap while monetary shocks also a¤ect the latter. This
reaction alters output and so employment; with wages xed this drives agents away from their ex-
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price leisure choice, a¤ecting their welfare. We also show in Table 2 how monetary policy choices a¤ect
expected welfare. The choice of whether to target ination or prices is irrelevant since it is only the
current price shock reaction that matters. Thus what matters in the interest rate rule is the size of
the reactions to ination or prices and to the output gap. Higher ination or price coe¢ cients worsen
the e¤ect of productivity shocks because they dampen price changes which means that real wages do
not change as much as they should to match productivity change. Higher reactions to the output gap
dampen movements in it and employment which move workers away from their ex-price choices. What
we notice is that while there are e¤ects here, they are not at all big, because the utility function does
not have much curvature in leisure. In the Calvo model the big losses arise because of price and wage
dispersion. Hence we can say that e¤ectively the results are the same as in the analytic model: full
rational indexation is optimal and in this case monetary policy is (e¤ectively) impotent.
Full Rational indexing (always optimal) EWelfare: Productivity Monetary Total
Ination targeting  0:00381  0:00098  0:0048
Price targeting  0:00381  0:00098  0:0048
Stricter Ination targeting  0:00426  0:00098  0:00524
Stricter Price targeting  0:00426  0:00098  0:00524
Ination targeting
(higher weight on output gap)
 0:00376  0:00092  0:00468
Price targeting
(higher weight on output gap)
 0:00376  0:00092  0:00468
Table 2: Expected welfare for di¤erent types of indexation assuming only current information is micro;
interest rule with ination and price level targets (stochastic simulation of monetary and productitivity
shocks, each with standard error of 0.01).
5.1 Conclusions on case of micro current information only
What we have found in this case of micro current infromation is that full rational indexation is the
dominant strategy for private agents. This has strong implications for monetary policy. First, it is
irrelevant whether the interest rate rule targets ination or prices since only the shock to prices or
ination matters and it is the same under both rules. Second, the coe¢ cients of the rule make no
di¤erence at all to expected welfare in the analytic model (because current prices respond to current
productivity shocks only) and in the full model they make virtually no di¤erence (since they only enter
through the e¤ect on employment whose e¤ect on welfare is minor).
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6 Full model results when agents observe full current informa-
tion
We now turn to the case where full current information is available to private agents. This is the default
assumption made in New Keynesian models. We also use the default assumption about information used
by them and others who use this approach: namely that agents know all current information, macro and
micro, when they form their expectations at t; the indexation formula still uses the lagged information
because of lags in application. Hence our initial simulations use the model exactly as in this literature
except for the addition of the indexation formula, so that we can gauge the e¤ect solely of adding in this
one element.
As we noted earlier the justication for this full current information assumption presumably lies in
the overlap between the length of time in which prices and wages are not changed at all  a quarter 
and the production of current macro information by statistics o¢ ces and the private sector itself. In the
course of three months price and wage setters may well be fairly well informed about what is going on
in that quarter so that the assumption of full knowledge may be a close approximation. At any rate we
now explore the implications of this assumption within the full model.
We thus carry out the stochastic simulation under the assumption of full information being available
in period t (Table 3) As in Table. 1 the pair (k1; kw1) show the weights on lagged and rational indexation
in indexation formulas for prices and wages respectively, while (k0; kw0) shows whether prices and wages
are partially or fully indexed. Our stochastic simulations are done for 100 sets of 40 overlapping shocks
 with both productivity and monetary shocks. Like Minford and Nowell (2003), we treat each period
outcome as a stochastic experiment of equal likelihood. We ignore the discount rate in calculation of the
expected welfare. Firstly, in each set, in the rst period, it runs for the rst shock and records the welfare
of this period. The rst period values are then used as the base values for the next period simulation and
so on. Then.we have 4000 observations which we average to get expected welfare. This process repeats
for each (k0; kw0; k1; kw1), where values of these parameters all belong to the interval of [0; 1] and they
move with a step of 0:2: Finally, we compare all the expected welfare values to nd the weighting scheme
that gives the maximum expected welfare.
Table 3 reports the results of stochastic simulations on the full model, showing the optimal indexation
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scheme under our two shocks to productivity and money.
k1 kw1 k0 kw0 Best expected welfare
Ination targeting 0 0 1 1  0:00572
Price targeting 0 0 0:8 1  0:00096
Stricter price target 0 0 0:8 1  0:00034
Shocks assumed to be both monetary and productivity each with standard error of 0.01.
Table 3: Optimal index weighting scheme under ination and price level targeting with full current
information assumption
We note that:
(1) lagged indexation does not have any weight in the optimal indexation scheme.
(2) monetary policy is e¤ective on welfare; as we move from ination to price targeting and then to
stricter price targeting expected welfare improves.
(3) the extent of price indexation also responds endogenously to this change in monetary policy: it
drops somewhat. While full rational indexation is best under ination targeting, price indexation drops
to only 80% (though still on the rational index) as price level targeting is introduced.
Let us consider these points in turn.
(1) To understand why lagged indexation does not enter the optimal indexation scheme, we refer back
above to where we showed that lagged indexation created an additional correlation between lagged price
surprises and lagged prices: this tends to raise the variability of accumulated reset prices on balance.
Hence the optimal indexation scheme only has rational indexation in it. The explanation can be briey
described as follows: the reset price under lagged indexation is given as the reset price under rational
indexation plus an extra term
logP t (lagged) = logP

t (rational) 

t 1   t 2
1  

(32)
where vt 1 = logPt 1   Et 1 logPt. The reset price under the rational expectation is only a func-
tion of the current and lagged productivity shocks. The term  

t 1 t 2
1 

in the reset price un-
der lagged indexation contains all past productivity and monetary shocks. The di¤erence between
expected welfare under rational indexation and lagged indexation is divided into two parts. The rst
part consists of all the terms (q) that are not related to lagged productivity shock (zt 1), such as
all the productivity shocks that occur before or at period (t  2) and all monetary shocks. These
shocks are the ones that do not enter the reset price expression under rational indexation. The ex-
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pected welfare of this part is  p 1+

1 
1 

var (q) 5 which must worsen the expected welfare under
lagged indexation compared with rational indexation. The second part of the expected welfare consists
only of terms in zt 1 which are hence correlated with welfare under rational indexation. This part is
 p 1+

002 + ( 0 + 
00)2 + (1  )00 ( 0 + 00)

var(z), which turns out for the calibrated values
of the model to improve expected welfare compared with rational indexation. In aggregate the compar-
ison between the resulted expected welfare levels under lagged and rational indexation depends on the
magnitudes of the two parts above. The simulation results suggest that the rst part dominates the
second, so that lagged indexation lowers expected welfare by introducing additional lagged shocks into
the reset price.
(2) Monetary policy is now e¤ective on expected welfare because full information causes current
monetary and productivity shocks to a¤ect both reset prices and wages and the interest rate rule modies
these e¤ects through its reaction coe¢ cients. We can demonstrate this conclusion in the analytic model
with its assumptions of no labour market, no capital accumulation, and only price setting. reset price.
This models solution for the reset price under full rational indexation is:
logP t = 1:5134zt   1:0141zt 1   1:4095t + 0:7659t 1 (33)
Here the monetary shock and its lagged value join the productivity shock and its lagged value in
a¤ecting the reset price and so expected welfare.
Moving from an ination to a price-level target has the e¤ect of increasing the response of real
interest rates to price shocks and so dampening these. The reason is that price-level targeting e¤ectively
raises the real interest rate, rt, response to a price shock because rt = Rt   Ett+1, which is rt =
rule  (EtPt+1   Pt). Under ination targeting, the last term in the real interest rate equation is small
or zero so the real interest, rt, is just the rule; but under price-level targeting, EtPt+1 is small or zero, so
the rule becomes rule+Pt: Therefore, a price-level target stops prices moving as much as they do under
an ination target. This reduces the variance of the reset price and also that of both of the real wage
and of employment which additionally enter the welfare function in the full model. We can see the e¤ect
of the reduced reset price variance from simulations of the analytic model under full current information
5 qt i = i jqt j
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and full rational indexation  Table 4 below
Ination target Price target
Productivity
 0:001363
Monetary
 0:001026
Total
 0:002389
Productivity
 0:00087
Monetary
 0:000498
Total
 0:00137
Table 4: Expected welfare for rational indexation under interest rule with ination and price level targets,
assuming full current information (stochastic simulation of monetary and productitivty shocks, each with
standard error of 0.01)
(3) We turn last to why indexation is sensitive to monetary policy. We can understand this in
terms of the alteration less than full rational indexation creates in the reset price, pt : The reset price
equation under full rational indexation can be written as a function of unexpected current and lagged
price changes:
(1  ) logP t = logPUEt    logPUEt 1 ; (34)
If we now deviate from full rational indexation by reducing the indexation to (1   k) this gives us
instead
(1  ) logP t = logPUEt + kEt 1 logPt    logPUEt 1   kEt 2 logPt 1; (35)
We can see that this creates a potential correlation between Et 1 logPtand logPUEt 1 : Suppose there
is a shock to the price level, then under price-level targeting there is a commitment to remove some
or all of this shock from next periods price level; thus write Et 1 logPt = (1   ) logPUEt 1 where 
is the model-generated persistence in prices and  is the extent of its removal by the price-targeting
rule (thus we can think of  as the persistence that would occur as  tends to zero, ie the price-level
target operates very slowly). It follows that the variance of logP t which enters expected welfare will
equal ( 11  )
2[V ar logPUE ](1+ [k(1 )]2+ f2+[k(1 )]2  2k(1 )g). The di¤erence of this
from the variance at k = 0 is ( 11  )
2[V ar logPUE ]([k(1  )]2 + [k(1  )]2   2k(1  )): For this
di¤erence to be negative for positive fk; (1   )g we require that 2 > (1   )(1 + k2): Price-level
targeting generates a value of  close to unity, hence reducing the right hand side to close to zero  the
stricter the closer to zero. However, ination-targeting tends to induce a positive serial correlation, ,
between rates of ination; thus the serial correlation between price levels is 1 +  = (1  ) when  is
calculated from the ination-targeting rule.
So what we nd is that price-level targeting produces a reason to bias indexation away from 100% in
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order to induce a helpful correlation o¤setting the persistence. E¤ectively it is partly doing the job of
indexation by brining prices back onto target.
7 Implications of rational indexation for the e¤ects of monetary
policy
What are the impulse responses to a monetary shock under the three monetary regimes we have identied?
The charts show them in turn for ination targeting, price targeting and stricter price targeting, the
latter two with endogenously slightly lower than full (rational) indexation. What we see is that they
have none of the supposed hallmark properties of New Keynesian models: there is little persistence, no
hump shapein either ination or output, but rather there is a brief moving shock oscillation followed
by virtually no residual e¤ect at all. Price level targeting increases stability, the stricter the greater the
increase. As for the productivity shock (Figure 2) we see a rather similar e¤ect to that of a monetary
shock superimposed on the steady declining e¤ect of declining productivity on output and consumption.
There is plainly no nominal rigidity to speak of in these e¤ects; there is solely an e¤ect of the Calvo
mechanism causing relative prices to move in response to both shocks because only a minority of price
and wage setters are able to change their relative price currently in response to a current shock.
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Figure 1: Dynamic paths after an unexpected 0.01 rise in interest rate under di¤erent monetary regimes
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Figure 2: Dynamic paths after an unexpected 0.01 rise in productivity under di¤erent monetary regimes
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8 General Conclusions
This paper set out to discover what sort of indexation arrangements would be made cooperatively by
price- and wage-setting agents operating under Calvo contracts, assuming they were restricted to some
response to lagged public price or wage information. We investigated two sorts of indexing formula: one
is simply to the lagged price or wage, the other is to the lagged expectation of the current price or wage.
We found, under a wide variety of assumptions about the structure of the model, about the extent of
current macro information, and about the nature of monetary targeting, that either full or close to full
indexation to the rational expectation of prices (for price-setters) and of wages (for wage-setters) was
optimal  rationalindexation thus dominates.
The implications of this optimising choice for the behaviour of the economy and for the choice of
monetary targeting rule are of some interest also. We found that the economy behaves under rational
indexation somewhat similarly to a New Classical model, with shocks producing an immediate uctuation
in both prices and output followed by a fairly rapid return to steady state. As for monetary policy, the
more this follows a price level target and the more strictly that it does so, the greater the economys
stability (and hence welfare).
It might be argued that these results are of little empirical relevance on the grounds that empirical
impulse responses to shocks are hump-shapedand that models with simple lagged indexation t the
data well. However, we have cited recent evidence showing both that empirical impulse responses are not
necessarily hump-shaped and that models with little rigidity actually t the data better than the Calvo
model with lagged indexation. Thus we would argue that these results are of considerable relevance to
those wishing to use models of the Calvo type but allowing for some indexation mechanism, as well as
for those wishing to use models with limited nominal rigidity.
In e¤ect we would like to suggest that rational agents facing micro-based limits on price- and wage-
setting can circumvent them to a large degree by the appropriate choice of indexing mechanism, thus
approximating fairly closely to the operation of exible markets with lagged macro information. Thus
there are incentives for them to cooperate in setting up such a mechanism. This set-up may also be
empirically close to the data.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Solving the model under rational indexation
9.1.1 Welfare: equation (23)
E
 
ut   uFLEXt

=  E lnDPt
=  1
2
1i=0p
i (1  ) 1  i (1  ) var  logP t i
+1j=0
1
i=0p
i+j (1  )2 Cov  logP t i; logP t j
= (1) + (2)
and
logP t =  00zt + 00zt 1
Therefore, var
 
logP t i

=
 
1 + 2

002var(z) and (1) is
(1) =  1
2
1i=0p
i (1  ) 1  i (1  )  1 + 2002var(z)
=  1
2
p (1  )
 
1 + 2

002var(z)1i=0
i

1  i (1  )
=  1
2
p (1  )
 
1 + 2

002var(z)
2
1  2
=  p002

 
1 + 2

1 + 
var(z)
and (2) is
(2) = p (1  )2 1j=01i=0i+jE
 
logP t i logP

t j

= p (1  )2
2666666666666664
i = 0; j = 1; 2:::

  002 var(z)
i = 1; j = 2; 3:::
3
  002 var(z)
:
3777777777777775
=  002p (1  )2

1  2 var(z)
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Thus,
E
 
ut   uFLEXt

=  p002var(z) (36)
9.2 Solving the model under lagged indexation
9.2.1 Ination: equation (27)
Under lagged indexation we start by deriving the equation (27) as in the text. Manipulate the equations
for ination and the Aggregate Demand curve respectively:
t = logPt   log ~Pt = (1  ) logP

t
1  L
and
log Yt =
1
1  B 1 f 
t +  logZt    logMtg
to get
(1  L)t = (1  ) (1  )
1  B 1 E
t ( (log Yt   logZt) + t)
and then
t =
1  
1  L
1  
1  B 1Et



1
1  B 1
n
 t   (1 B 1)) logZt    logMt
o
+ t

Due to the assumption that in period t producers know both macro information from period (t  1) and
micro information in period t; the above equation is rewritten as:
(1  L)t = (1  ) (1  ) Et
(1  B 1) (1  B 1) (1 B
 1) (  logZt)
  (1  ) (1  ) E
t 1 logMt
(1  B 1) (1  B 1)
  (1  ) (1  ) (
)
(1  B 1) (1  B 1)E
t 1t +
(1  ) (1  )
(1  B 1) E
t 1t (37)
Equation (37) can be written as:
30
(1  L)t   (1  ) (1  )
(1  B 1) E
t 1t +
(1  ) (1  ) ()
(1  B 1) (1  B 1)E
t 1t
= (1  ) (1  ) Et(1 B
 1) (  logZt)
(1  B 1) (1  B 1)   (1  ) (1  )

Et 1 logMt
(1  B 1) (1  B 1)
The LHS of this equation is rearranged into:
266666666664
(1  L)  1  Et 1B 1
(1  Et 1B 1)t
  (1  ) (1  ) (1  Et 1B 1)Et 1t
+(1  ) (1  )Et 1t
377777777775
=
2666666666666664
1  L 
0BB@  +  
(1  ) (1  )
1CCAEt 1B 1
+Et 1B 2 +  ( + )Et 2
 2Et 2B 1
+(1  ) (1  )Et 1
3777777777777775
t
=
0BBBBBB@
1  0:67L+ 1:42Et 1B 1
+0:56Et 1B 2 + 1:01Et 2
 0:38Et 2B 1 + 0:88Et 1
1CCCCCCAt
while the RHS is reduced to :
(1  ) (1  )
0BB@ Et(1 B
 1)(  logZt)
(1 EtB 1)(1 EtB 1)
 
1  Et 1B 1 (1  Et 1B 1)
 Et 1 logMt
1CCA
= (1  ) (1  )
0BB@ (1 1)(1 1)(1 1)
 
1  Et 1B 1 (1  Et 1B 1) logZt
 2 logMt 1
1CCA
=
(1  ) (1  )
(1  1) (1  1)
26666664
(1   1)
0BB@ 1  Et 1B 1 
Et 1B 1 + Et 1B 2
1CCA logZt 
 2 (1  1) (1  1) logMt 1
37777775
= 
2664 (1   1)
 
1  Et 1B 1   Et 1B 1 + Et 1B 2 logZt 
 2 (1  1) (1  1) logMt 1
3775 (38)
We are only interested in zt i, therefore the RHS can be simplied to:
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 (1   1)
 
1  Et 1B 1   Et 1B 1 + Et 1B 2 logZt
=  (1   1)
 
logZt   ( + ) 21 logZt 1 + 31 logZt 1

=  (1   1)

zt
1  1L
  21 ( +    1)
zt 1
1  1L

Multiply both RHS and LHS by (1  1L),
t   (1 + )t 1 + (1  ) (1  ) (   1)
 
Et 1t   1Et 2t 1

+ ((1  ) (1  )   ( + ))  Et 1t+1   1Et 2t  2  Et 2t+1   1Et 3t
+  ( + )
 
Et 2t   1Et 3t 1

+ 1t 2 + 
  Et 1t+2   Et 2t+1
=  (1   1)
 
zt   21 ( +    1) zt 1

(39)
Given the assumption that t = 1i=0
izt i, we collect terms:
(zt)
0 = 
 (1   1) (40)
(zt 1)
1 ((1  ) (1  ) (   1) + 1)  (1 + ) 0 + 3 + ((1  ) (1  )   ( + )) 2
=   (1   1) 21 ( +    1) (41)
(zt 2)
0 = 2 (1 + (1  ) (1  ) (   1) (1  1) +  ( + )) 
0BB@ (1 + ) + 1 (1  )
(1  ) (   1)
1CCA 1
+ 3 ((1  ) (1  )   ( + )   (+ 1)) + 44 + 10 (42)
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(zt i; i  3)
0 = 11  
0BB@ (1 + ) + 1 (1  )
(1  ) (   1)
1CCA 2 + 5 +
0BBBBBB@
1 + (1  ) (1  ) (   1) 
1 ((1  ) (1  )   ( + ))
+ ( + ) + 1
2
1CCCCCCA 3
+ ((1  ) (1  )   ( + )   (+ 1)  1 ( + )) 4 (43)
The last term can be generalised as a 4th order di¤erence equation:
i+2   0:763i+1 + 3:43i   4:32i 1 + 1:1125i 2 = 0 for i  3; (44)
which has characteristic roots of [x =  0:226 1:904i;x = 0:86093 and x = 0:35153] : Given the rst
two roots are very small, the equation can be reduced to
(1  0:351513L) (1  0:86093L) i = 0 (45)
or i   1:2125i 1 + 0:3026i 2 = 0 for i  3
Therefore, from equation(40), (41), (42) and (45), we can build the system of equations and solve for
0 and 1:
 0:464 = 0
0:393 = 1:881   1:60 + 0:5643 + 1:422
0 = 1:57132   2:341   0:5183 + 0:5644 + 0:6230
0 = 3   1:21252 + 0:31
0 = 4   1:21253 + 0:32
The solution is 0 =  0:464 and 1 =  0:151
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9.2.2 Reset Price: equation (31)
Substituting equation (12)
logPUEt = (1  ) logP UEt
into equation (25)
Et 1 logP t =
 vt 1 + vt 2    logPUEt 1
1  
we get
Et 1 logP t =
 vt 1 + vt 2    (1  ) logP UEt 1
1   (46)
Under the rational expectation and equation (26), the new reset price is
logP t = E
t 1 logP t + logP
UE
t =
=
 vt 1 + vt 2
1      logP
UE
t 1 + logP
UE
t
=
 vt 1 + vt 2
1     

1  
1  1

1 + 
1  

( zt 1) +

1  
1  1

1 + 
1  

( zt)
=
 vt 1 + vt 2
1   +
0
1   ( zt + zt 1) (47)
9.2.3 Welfare
The rst one involves all the elements with qt 1 in the expression for E logDPt:
E lnDPt (qt 1) =
1
2
1i=0p
i (1  ) 1  i (1  ) var  logP t i
  1j=01i=0pi+j (1  )2 Cov
 
logP t i; logP

t j

= A(qt 1) +B(qt 1)
Here, we only include in the variance of logP t the terms in qt 1 where qt follows some autocorrelation
process qt i = i jqt j , so that var (logP t [qt 1]) = var(q): Therefore
A (qt 1) = p

1 + 
var(q) (48)
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Consider B (qt 1) now. First we assume that i j = 1; then
B (qt 1) =  p (1  )2 1j=01i=0i+ji jvar (q)
2666666666666664
i = 0; j = 1; 2:::
+ 2 + :::
i = 1; j = 2; 3:::
3 + 4 + :::
:
3777777777777775
=  pvar (q)
1 + 
(49)
Summing up equations (48) and (49) gives
E lnDPt(qt 1) = 0 (50)
However, if i j < 1 for any i  j; then this term must be negative. Thus for example suppose that
i j = 
i j so that q is a rst-order autocorrelation process, then
B (qt 1) =  p (1  )2 1j=01i=0i+ji jvar (q)
2666666666666664
i = 0; j = 1; 2:::
+ 22 + :::
i = 1; j = 2; 3:::
3+ 42 + :::
:
3777777777777775
=   (1  )pvar (q)
(1 + ) (1  ) (51)
As a result of equations (48) and (51), the expected price dispersion is
E lnDPt (qt 1) = p

1 + 
(var(q))   (1  )
(1 + ) (1  )pvar (q)
= p

1 + 

1  
1  

var (q) (52)
So comparing equations (50) and (52) ; we nd that this term qt 1 must raise E logDPt; this in
turn reduces the expected welfare. Note that q contains all terms in money shocks and all terms in
productivity shocks from (t  2) backwards.
The second part involves all other terms that are not qt 1;that is the term  0zt 1. Thus it analyses
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the e¤ect of this term  0zt 1 on expected welfare. So looking at this part of logP

t :
logP t ( 0zt 1) =
0
1   (zt 1   zt) +  0zt 1;
we nd
E lnDPt( 0zt 1) =
1
2
1i=0p
i (1  ) 1  i (1  ) var  logP t i
  1j=01i=0pi+j (1  )2 Cov
 
logP t i; logP

t j

= A( 0zt 1) +B( 0zt 1):
Given
A( 0zt 1) = p

1 + 

002 + ( 0 + 
00)2

var(z)
and
B( 0zt 1) = p
 (1  )
1 + 
00 ( 0 + 
00) var(z)
this part of expected price dispersion is
E lnDPt ( 0zt 1) = p

1 + 

002 + ( 0 + 
00)2 + (1  )00 ( 0 + 00)

var(z) (53)
Since equation (53) is derived using the part of equation (31) ; which partly consists equation for logP t
under the rational expectation indexing, we compare equation (53) and the expected price dispersion
under rational indexing (equation(23)):
E lnDPt = p

1 + 

002 + (00)2 + (1  )002

var(z) (54)
It follows that the di¤erence between E lnDPt under lagged and rational indexation due to the
term in  0zt 1 is: p

1+

( 0)
2
[1 + (1+)
00
 0
]

var(z) from which it can be seen that for this term to
worsen welfare under lagged indexation requires that (1+)
00
 0
should be positive (or if negative should
be greater than  1 which can e¤ectively be ruled out). Now by construction  0 =  11  ( 1) so the
(relevant su¢ cient) condition for the term to worsen welfare is that 1 > 0:
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The coe¢ cient 1 comes from the path of prices in the period after the shock; this cannot be solved
out analytically as it involves solving for all the i in the equation from Appendix 9.2.1 (involving among
other things nding the two stable roots of a fourth order di¤erence equation). Here we nd it numerically
using the calibration of Canzoneri et al. (2004); the value of 1 turns out to be  0:151;which implies
that the term in  0zt 1 improves welfare.
The reason for this is that rational indexation causes reset prices to follow a rst order moving average
in which the lagged shock in prices when there is a productivity shock is corrected. The pattern is jagged
and therefore costly in the rst two quarters. Under lagged indexation the reset price follows a moving
average in the path of ination which responds smoothly to a productivity shock; the path is therefore
smoother in the rst two quarters.
What we have found overall therefore is that for productivity shocks the e¤ect of rational compared
with lagged indexation is ambiguous; extra noise is introduced by the lagged index but some of it is
correlated with the lagged productivity in a potentially helpful way. For monetary shocks rational
indexation is unambiguously superior because in this case these shocks have no e¤ect on the reset price
and therefore on welfare; under lagged indexation monetary shocks at t   1 and before all enter the
current reset price setting.
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